In her recent comment to POLITICO, Head of the Mission of Ukraine to NATO Alyona Getmanchuk stressed that Ukraine needs more air defence capabilities. However, NATO Allies are beginning to question whether they can help Ukraine withstand the growing scale of Russian attacks.

Below is the full text of her comment:

When I talk to NATO countries about the aerial terror Russia is inflicting on the Ukrainian people, I still encounter a great deal of empathy and support — and, in many cases, a willingness to contact their capitals once again and explore what more can be done to help Ukraine with air defence.

I do not see fatigue, even though, after almost five years of war, air defence has become what some of our partners call Ukraine’s “eternal” request. No one is turning their back on Ukraine. When we requested an extraordinary meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council in response to Russia’s intensifying attacks, NATO immediately agreed, and Secretary General Mark Rutte personally chaired the meeting.

At the same time, I also see signs of desperation and doubt over whether our partners can really help Ukraine withstand attacks on such a massive scale. The logic is straightforward: can we truly be effective against this level of terror when Ukraine’s most pressing need is Patriot interceptors and we do not have enough of them, as stockpiles have been depleted and production rates remain insufficient?

The reality, however, is that almost every country that Ukraine has approached can either do more or act more quickly. Or both.

This is especially true now, as the nature of the Russian aerial threat has changed recently. Ukraine needs not only Patriot missiles, but also the means to address a new and very real threat: jet-powered drones.

Our short list of urgent air-defence needs therefore consists of three major categories, not one: Patriot interceptors, air-to-air missiles, and all types of MANPADS and missiles for them.

There are only two ways to provide these quickly.

The first is to contribute to PURL, the NATO initiative that allows European countries and Canada, as well as some NATO partners, to purchase critical American weaponry for Ukraine. Each PURL package includes not only Patriot interceptors, but also other urgently needed air-defence systems and missiles, including NASAMS and HAWK.

Yes, the quantities of some of these weapons — Patriot interceptors in particular — remain very limited and insufficient. But PURL is currently the only predictable and credible mechanism for Ukraine to receive Patriot interceptors at least through the end of this year. Despite various predictions related to the war in Iran, the United States continues to provide weapons through PURL. But someone has to pay for them.

The second way is to transfer a certain number of missiles directly from existing national stockpiles. This makes even more sense when some of those missiles are approaching the end of their service life. There is hardly a better way to decommission them than by using them in the Ukrainian sky.

More broadly, we need to stop viewing assistance that enables Ukraine to defend itself as purely a matter of supporting Ukraine. It is also in NATO’s own interest.

And this is not only a moral argument, although the moral dimension matters enormously. A single interceptor can sometimes save multiple lives. Among those lives may be people you know — someone you recently travelled with on a business trip, met at a conference or exhibition, or simply crossed paths with while on holiday.

In most cases, supporting Ukraine is also directly beneficial to NATO countries themselves.

First, the more drones and missiles Ukraine can destroy in its own airspace, the fewer will cross the borders of neighbouring NATO countries.

Just as a Russian soldier killed or severely wounded in Ukraine will never reach NATO territory, a Russian drone or missile destroyed over Ukraine will never reach a NATO country either. We are effectively containing Russia’s advance on the ground. In the air, without the necessary capabilities, containing it is much more difficult.

Of course, it is even better to prevent a missile from being launched from Russian territory in the first place by striking ballistic missile launchers and missile production facilities. That is why, alongside its efforts to secure more air-defence capabilities, Ukraine will continue working to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities. Partners who are unable to help with air defence can contribute in this area instead.

Second, when we talk about transferring missiles from your stockpiles, what we are proposing is, first and foremost, a swap — not a donation.

Ukraine is ready to replace missiles transferred from existing stocks with brand-new missiles that we have already contracted and will begin receiving next year. What we need is to get through this winter.

Third, Ukraine is itself placing substantial orders, using both partner funding and the EU’s Ukraine Support Loan. These contracts cover not only hundreds of Patriot missiles — both PAC-2 and PAC-3 — but also European solutions, including SAMP/T with ASTER 30 missiles, IRIS-T and others.

Supporting Ukraine therefore also means supporting the defence industries of NATO member states.

Fourth, deploying your systems and missiles in Ukraine means continuously improving them.

Only by undergoing this process can these systems remain effective against Russia’s constant adaptations. Russia is changing ballistic-missile trajectories and introducing other modifications designed to make interception more difficult.

This is precisely why we are constantly improving the systems our partners provide. Ukraine today may well operate some of the most effective Patriot systems in the world. Through intensive and effective operational use, combined with continuous feedback from our warfighters, some of these systems have already undergone a number of improvements.

Fifth, the scale of civilian infrastructure destruction now taking place in Ukraine’s major cities — Kyiv and the Kyiv region in particular — is dramatically increasing the eventual cost of reconstruction.

The more we are able to protect today, the less we will have to rebuild tomorrow.

And finally, sixth: if everyone genuinely wants this war to end, Putin will not make any meaningful compromise as long as he believes he retains an advantage in the air and can continue openly striking schools, medicine warehouses, trains and hypermarkets in the hope of forcing Ukraine to capitulate.

That is precisely what he is doing. He is trying to spread fear, paralyse the economy and compel Ukrainians to surrender.

It will not work.

Every person who has lost a relative, a friend or a home will demand a more just settlement from their government, not a less just one.

There is a phrase that has become popular in Kyiv: “If you haven’t been killed, you go to work.”

It may sound grim, but it accurately captures the mood that prevails despite Russia’s aerial terror.

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